COLLINS AND THE INVENTION OF “CURTILAGE”
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ABSTRACT
In its 2018 decision, Collins v. Virginia, the Court seemingly took for granted the idea that the curtilage was
part of a person’s “home” under the Fourth Amendment. The result was a quick resolution of the case for the
majority: if the curtilage—the area immediately surrounding the home—was the same as the home, and the
driveway was part of the curtilage (and therefore was the home for constitutional purposes), then a search of a
motorcycle in the driveway was in fact a search under the Fourth Amendment and required a warrant. As entering
the four walls of a home without a warrant would violate the sanctity of the home, so too would entering the
driveway without a warrant violate (in Justice Sotomayor’s arresting phrase) “the sanctity of the curtilage.” Most
commentary on the case has followed Justice Sotomayor in believing that this, indeed, was a rather easy case—
almost to the point of wondering why the Court would bother to take it all.
But the Court’s unreflective use of the curtilage, and its obeisance to the supposed sacredness of the curtilage ignores
the reality that the concept of “curtilage” is one without genuine support in either text or history. The Court has,
in fact, repeatedly and consistently misread Blackstone on the curtilage. The problem, in a nutshell, is that the
Court has taken Blackstone as meaning something that he clearly did not—that somehow the land near the home
itself is part of the home. But Blackstone defined the “home” as including not the curtilage—the land outside the
home—but only the buildings contained in the curtilage.
Nor does the curtilage get much support from the Katz “reasonable expectations of privacy” test, a point somewhat
better established. If the test is reasonable expectations of privacy, then labels—“curtilage” or “open fields”—
cannot replace actually looking at what those expectations are, and if they apply to the land in question. In other
words, we can only call a piece of land “curtilage” after we have decided we have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that land; we cannot begin with the idea that some land is already curtilage. As a result, while the
Court has long believed that curtilage finds support both in the text of the Fourth Amendment (because it is part
of the “house”) and in the Katz test (because the curtilage is associated with heightened expectations of privacy),
it actually has support on neither ground. The stunning failure of curtilage doctrine raises deeper questions about
the Court’s Fourth Amendment’s jurisprudence more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Carpenter got much attention as the Fourth Amendment case of
the 2017–2018 Supreme Court Term, a lesser-noticed case, Collins v. Virginia,
may prove to be the more enduring, at least as a doctrinal matter.1 Not only
was Collins a more decisive win for privacy, 8–1 rather than 5–4, it seemed
firmly to establish “curtilage” as a fundamental concept in the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.2 Whereas the use of “curtilage” in Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Florida v. Jardines seemed somewhat controversial,3 in
Collins it was taken for granted by all nine members of the Court that

1

2
3

See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (finding a “search” when cell site
location information was collected for more than seven days); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663
(2018) (holding that the automobile warrant requirement exception does not justify a police officer’s
invasion of the curtilage of a home, which includes a partially enclosed top portion of the driveway
of a home).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1663 (explaining the breakdown of votes among the nine Justices in Collins).
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 18–22 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning the boundaries
of the license to enter the curtilage). More precisely, the controversy seemed to be not about the
status of “curtilage” but about how to define the scope of the license to come onto the curtilage. The
very idea of curtilage in that decision mostly got a free pass. At the same time, Jardines marked the
first time where “curtilage” was used positively—in the sense that there was found to be a trespass
onto land that was curtilage. In prior cases, the Court had found that the land in question was not
curtilage. See discussion infra Part I.
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“curtilage” was a Fourth Amendment fixture.4 Curtilage was to be treated
as, indeed was, part of the “house” itself—and thus had a grounding in the
text of the Fourth Amendment, which extends its protections only to
“persons, papers, houses, and effects.”5 Justice Thomas in his concurring
opinion, while questioning whether the exclusionary rule had any support in
the original Fourth Amendment, did not hesitate to endorse the curtilage’s
“originalist” bona fides: the idea that the curtilage along with the house got
heightened protection went back, Thomas said, to Blackstone, who
“considered [the curtilage to be] part of the ‘hous[e]’ itself.”6 Even Justice
Alito, in dissent, agreed that a person’s “house,” under the Fourth
Amendment, encompassed the curtilage.7 But the clearest indication of
curtilage’s special status was the striking phrase used by Justice Sotomayor
for the majority, when she spoke of the “sanctity of the curtilage,”8 a
sacredness previously reserved only for the home.9
The problem is that much, if not all, of this is wrong, and we can start
with Justice Thomas’s misreading of Blackstone (and the misreading the
Court had given it several times before him, and which countless lower courts
have repeated).10 Blackstone emphasized the curtilage in his discussion of
burglary because it was the buildings that resided within the curtilage that

4
5
6

7

8

9

10

See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1667; Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1676 (Thomas, J., concurring); Collins, 138 S.
Ct. at 1681 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (majority opinion) (explaining the relationship between curtilage
and the house with respect to the Fourth Amendment).
See id. at 1676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225)
(discussing the meaning of curtilage at the founding). The Court has praised Blackstone as the
“preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
715 (1999). This was certainly the case for Justice Scalia. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 593–94 (2008) (citing Alden’s discussion of Blackstone with approval).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1681 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito, while not disagreeing with the
concept of curtilage, would have adopted a more flexible balancing test in Collins to determine
whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. See discussion infra Part III.
This phrase was only used by courts prior to Collins twice, and in a less definitive way. See United
States v. Sullivan, No. 3:09-CR-28, 2010 WL 1257720 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2010) (“Defendant
argues that consensual encounters occur in public places, not ‘the sanctity of the curtilage of a
private residence.’”); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(“However, the sanctity of the curtilage is not absolute.”).
See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 178 (1984)) (describing the “sanctity of a man’s home”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
601 (1980) (same); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (same).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the founding, curtilage was considered
part of the ‘hous[e]’ itself.”); see, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–13 (1986) (citing Blackstone on
curtilage as an “area” associated with a person’s home).
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mattered, and not the curtilage itself.11 Those buildings inside of the
curtilage, Blackstone said, were part of the home, not the property outside of
the curtilage.12 So curtilage was to be used to designate the buildings that
were part of the home; the curtilage—the land itself—was not to be taken as
the home. If this is the correct reading of Blackstone, as this Article argues it
is, then the idea that the curtilage is part of (even obviously part) of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection of the “house” becomes considerably weakened, if
not entirely fictional. In turning the curtilage from a space that designates
buildings that deserve protection into its own protected place, the Court has
falsely elevated the curtilage, giving it a meaning that extends past what the
text of the Fourth Amendment can reasonably bear.13 In fact, the
contemporary meaning of curtilage given by the Court was basically
invented by it in the 1980s, in the Oliver and Dunn decisions.14 Those
decisions are poorly reasoned—as well as in tension with one another15—
and the defense of curtilage given in Collins only serves to obscure the
questionable foundations of the Court’s curtilage doctrine.16
But the collapse of the curtilage doctrine reveals deeper fissures in the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For if protecting “curtilage”
does not fall under the Fourth Amendment’s text, neither does it find much
shelter in the Court’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.17 Under that
test, a place gets protection from the Fourth Amendment if a person expects it
to be protected, and society is prepared to find that expectation as
“reasonable.”18 The problem, however, with saying that curtilage is
protected under this “reasonable expectation of privacy,” or Katz, test is that

11
12
13
14

15

16
17
18

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (discussing curtilage in the context of
burglary).
See id. (classifying buildings as part of the home).
See infra Part I.
See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (holding that the area near a barn lay outside
the curtilage of the house); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984) (describing
curtilage as “the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends.”).
See Vanessa Rownaghi, Driving into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy, 11 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1172–73 (2003) (citing Dunn, 480 U.S.
at 307–08 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (“Brennan also criticized the inconsistency between the Court’s
decisions in Oliver and Dunn, noting that while Oliver refused to entertain a case-by-case analysis in
ascertaining the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in an open field, Dunn adopted an
ad hoc approach by insisting that the expectation of privacy in an area be evaluated pursuant to
the unique factual circumstances of each case.”).
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (addressing “reasonable expectation of
privacy”).
See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the Katz test).

May 2020]

COLLINS AND THE INVENTION OF “CURTILAGE”

759

saying something is “curtilage” either begs the question (why do you
reasonably expect privacy in this place, whatever you call it?) or is just a stand
in for an argument that has already been made (we call this place curtilage
because you can reasonably expect privacy there). In short, under the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, an invocation of curtilage is either
empty or redundant.19 Curtilage can do no independent work unless we
already know that the place is protected, but we will not know if it is protected
until we can say one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it—and of
course if we know that, we do not have to use the concept of “curtilage” at
all. While Collins and Jardines (and before them, Oliver and Dunn) seemed to
suggest that curtilage had a double justification in both the Constitution’s text
and the new Katz test, in fact, it may have no justification at all—neither as a
matter of the text nor as a matter of theory.20
The facts of Collins show well the looming problems.21 The motorcycle
at issue in Collins was in the driveway outside of the home—parked in what
Justice Sotomayor analogized to a “carport” or “parking patio.”22 But what
makes the driveway inherently part of the “curtilage”?23 The answer is
“nothing, really” but Sotomayor elides this point by referring, as Justice
Scalia had before in Jardines, to a footnote in Oliver—our ordinary everyday
intuitions should be enough to tell us that the driveway is part of the
curtilage.24 Many lower courts, in fact, have disagreed about driveways.25
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

See infra Part II (discussing curtilage in terms of the reasonable expectation of privacy test).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (noting that curtilage protection has long been “black letter law” and
is afforded because privacy expectations are heightened); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013)
(describing the Fourth Amendment and Katz as foundations for supporting property rights); United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (concluding that a barn area lay outside the curtilage of
a house); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173–74 (1984) (applying Katz and the Fourth
Amendment); Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (applying reasonable expectation of privacy to the Fourth
Amendment).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1668–69 (describing the uncovering of a motorcycle).
Id. at 1675; see also infra Appendix, Figure 1 (showing picture of motorcycle in “curtilage” of the
home in Collins).
See discussion infra Part II.
See infra Part I; see also Orin S. Kerr, Collins v. Virginia and the “Conception Defining the Curtilage,”
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May. 29, 2018, 3:44 PM), https://reason.com/2018/05/29/collins-vvirginia-and-a-thought-on-curt/ (“Recent cases suggest the concept [of curtilage] is easy and
intuitive, but I wonder if that is true.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted)
(“Here, as the district court noted, only the driveway’s proximity to the residence weighs in favor
of a finding that it was part of the curtilage of the home. The driveway was open and could be
observed from Greer Street. Although fences encircled part of the driveway, nothing blocked its
access or obstructed its view from the street. Finally, neither Beene nor Heard took steps to protect
their privacy, such as posting “no trespassing” signs. In an unpublished opinion, we held that a
similar driveway was not part of the curtilage of a defendant’s home; we agree with that analysis.
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However, once we have made this move—defined the driveway by fiat as
part of the curtilage—and take as our premise that the curtilage is “part of
the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,”26 the conclusion naturally
follows—the invasion of a person’s driveway to search the automobile is
tantamount to an invasion of the home to do the same search. Indeed, Justice
Sotomayor makes the point explicitly, as she has us “imagine” that the
motorcycle was not parked outside the home, in the driveway, but parked
inside the house.27 When we do that, Sotomayor concludes, we have an easy
case.28 The officer could no more walk down the driveway to search the car
than he could break down (or even open) the door of a house to do the same
thing.29 But if we get rid of the assumption that the curtilage is the house—
which we should—Collins becomes a much harder case. That is, when we
read “house” plainly as just meaning house and its associated buildings, it is no
longer obvious that going down a person’s driveway is the same as breaking
into their house—a distinction Blackstone surely would have noticed.30 Nor
is it obvious that the Katz test offers us much help, either. It certainly does
not make the case “easy,” as it would require a careful accounting of why
Collins had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the motorcycle parked in
his driveway.31 Collins turns out to be a hard case, even if the Court may have
ultimately reached the correct result.
This Article has three Parts. The first Part traces the roots of the mistaken
idea that curtilage is something like a place that deserves protection in its own

26
27
28
29
30
31

Likewise, we hold that the driveway here was not part of the curtilage of Beene’s home.”). As one
federal court put it:
It is by no means certain that the entry upon the driveway [by the defendant] was
contrary to the Fourth Amendment, even though there were no warrant or exceptional
circumstances excusing failure to obtain one. The driveway may not have been such a
place as to support a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the defendants.
United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 7–8 (9th Cir. 1973). For an excellent, although
somewhat dated, survey, see Rownaghi, supra note 15, at 1166 (“The collective result is a trend
toward sanctioning seizures that occur as a result of warrantless police intrusion in one’s driveway.
Consequently, driveways are increasingly subject to police search.”). The more general point is
that the fact that a driveway is close to the home can only be one factor in favor of calling it part of
the curtilage. As we shall see, Justice Sotomayor took the closeness of the driveway to the home as
decisive. This was a mistake.
Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670.
Id. at 1671; see also infra Appendix, Figure 2 (showing a picture of a car in a living room).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 (confirming that an application of the relevant legal principles to a
different factual scenario would be an easy case).
Id.
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. Of course, as discussed infra note 68,
“breaking” seems to refer to “breaking into” a structure, as opposed to trespassing onto land.
See infra Part III (discussing, in this context, Justice Alito’s dissent).
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right rather than a space that designates the structures that are worthy of
constitutional consideration.32 This mistake goes back to a misreading of
Blackstone, so it spends some time analyzing where Blackstone talks about
curtilage in his commentaries, mostly in his chapter on burglary.33 Part I
ends with a discussion of Justice Holmes’ opinion in Hester v. United States,
which started the path back to Blackstone as a way of understanding what
property was—and was not—protected under the Fourth Amendment.34
Hester, however, is such a crimped and crabbed opinion, it is hard to see
anything like a curtilage doctrine coming out of it (which has not stopped
many courts from seeing precisely that).35
The second Part digs deep into the invention of curtilage as not just a
space which designated what buildings were part of the home, but a separate
place worthy of its own protection, a move which started in earnest with the
two cases Oliver and Dunn.36 Oliver was mainly an “open fields” case, which
established that open fields did not have protection under the Fourth
Amendment, neither as a matter of the text nor as a matter of society’s
“reasonable expectations of privacy.”37 Oliver also mentioned the curtilage
by means of distinguishing “curtilage” from “open fields”—distinguishing
constitutionally protected from constitutionally unprotected—but almost
wholly in a negative way.38 Curtilage was precisely the place that was not
open fields—beyond that, there was no precise definition of the scope of
curtilage, besides a sort of “you’ll know it when you see it” commonsense
appeal.39 The Court would quickly reverse itself in Dunn and hold that we
can isolate several factors to decide when something is curtilage.40 But the
32
33
34

35
36

37
38
39

40

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (declining to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to “open fields”). Part I, infra, argues that this opinion has been subsequently misread,
or overread, as articulating a conception of curtilage.
See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (citing Hester to state curtilage “plays a
part . . . in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment”).
See id. at 301 (holding that curtilage is sometimes protected under the Fourth Amendment, depending
on four factors); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (distinguishing curtilage,
which can have Fourth Amendment protections, from open fields, which cannot).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177, 180.
Id. at 180 (“The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants
the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home.”).
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life
. . . .”).
See Thomas E. Curran III, Comment, The Curtilage of Oliver v. United States and United States v.
Dunn: How Far is Too Far?, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 397, 404 (1988) (viewing Dunn as a
necessary corrective to Oliver).
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Court struggles in Dunn to separate curtilage from the factors that define it,
and so may not advance the ball much further than what the Court said in
Oliver—that we do not have to define curtilage because it is “easily
understood.”41 It is this dodge that Justice Scalia would use in Jardines and
Justice Sotomayor again in Collins.42
It is upon the shaky foundations of Oliver, Dunn, and Jardines that Justice
Sotomayor rests her argument that Collins is an easy case, and it is her opinion
and Justice Alito’s dissent that are taken up by this Article’s third Part.43
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, commanding seven other votes, shows a striking
victory for the concept of curtilage, and more importantly, the equivalence
in privacy and “sanctity” of the curtilage with the home.44 But the
justification for granting this status to curtilage is sketchy, and so too is the
means of defining curtilage—which Justice Sotomayor chalks up to
“common sense.”45 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s patchwork defense of the
home inadvertently shows the Court’s shifting and uncertain foundation for
that category.46 Justice Alito in his dissent is right to raise questions about
the Court’s decision in Collins, and his flexible “balancing” approach is
intriguing.47 But the options facing the Court if it rejects the simple
equivalence of “the home” and “curtilage”—something Justice Alito seems
unwilling to do—are stark. Either the Court has to restrict the protections of
the Fourth Amendment to only persons, papers, houses and effects, which
would mean protecting neither open fields nor curtilage, or it would have to
extend the Fourth Amendment’s protections beyond the home and even past
the curtilage into open fields. Neither option is particularly desirable,
suggesting the mess that the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
in—something that we might discern in fractured Carpenter opinions, but

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See id. (setting out the factors that a court must consider when answering “extent-of-curtilage
questions” in any given case); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984).
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018) (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12); Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (same).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 (citing Jardines and Oliver in holding that a driveway “is properly
considered curtilage.”).
Id. at 1667, 1672 (“[S]earching a vehicle parked in the curtilage involves not only the invasion of
the Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle but also an invasion of the sanctity of the curtilage.”).
See id. at 1671 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7) (describing curtilage as
“familiar enough that it is easily understood from our daily experience”) .
See generally id. at 1668–75.
See id. at 1681, 1683 (Alito, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court’s conclusion that the officer needed
a warrant to search a vehicle on private property and instead advocating that “a case-specific
inquiry regarding the degree of intrusion on privacy is entirely appropriate when the motor vehicle . . . is
located on private property”).
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something that is also lurking not far below the surface in Collins.48 The
Conclusion tries to tease out the possible ways out from the Court’s flawed
“curtilage” doctrine.
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF CURTILAGE
The urtext for the invention of curtilage as a place that deserves
protection in its own right—protection to the same degree as the home
because it is in fact part of the home—is from Blackstone’s discussion of the
curtilage in his chapter on “Burglary” in the Commentaries. The quote (which
is given more fully in Section A) says that the home protects not only the
literal four walls of the home, but also “all it’s [sic] branches and
appurtenants, if within the curtilage or homestall.”49 It is this quotation that
is referenced in Oliver, which started the conception of curtilage as a place
that might deserve Fourth Amendment protection.50 It is repeated again by
Justice Scalia in Jardines and most recently by Justice Thomas in his
concurring opinion in Collins.51 The recent use by Justice Thomas is
especially important, given the context in which the quotation appears.
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion is an originalist brief par excellence
because it is about how the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment does
not support the modern use of the exclusionary rule.52 At the same time,
however, Justice Thomas does not dispute the accepted wisdom that the
original meaning of “home” also included the curtilage—and he has the
passage in Blackstone’s Commentaries to back him up.53 “At the founding,”
Justice Thomas writes, “the curtilage was part of the house itself.”54 In other
words, while the Founders would not accept the remedy to the constitutional
violation adopted by the Court in Collins (i.e., exclusion of evidence that was
the product of an unconstitutional search), they would accept that there was
48
49
50

51

52
53
54

See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (producing a majority opinion and
four separate dissents); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citing Blackstone) (“[T]he common law
distinguished ‘open fields’ from the ‘curtilage,’ the land immediately surrounding and associated
with the home.”). Hester also cited Blackstone, but as explained infra Part II, Holmes did not need
to rely on “curtilage” to decide that case, and in fact, did not even use the word.
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*225); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1676 (2018) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *225).
See, e.g., Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1676 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Founders would not have
understood the logic of the exclusionary rule either.”).
See id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *225).
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a constitutional violation, because the motorcycle was in the curtilage, and
the curtilage is protected by the Fourth Amendment as part of the “house.”
But is this understanding of curtilage correct? In fact, it is not, and so the
idea of curtilage as a separate and protected “space” under the Fourth
Amendment is a bit of a myth, started in the 1980s, but imagined back into
a fictional Blackstonian past.
A. Blackstone and the “Curtilage”
We should start with the passage in question that has been quoted
repeatedly by the Court. It arises in Blackstone’s Commentaries in an extended
discussion of burglary, an “offense against the habitation.” Here is the
relevant quotation, which winds up to a conclusion regarding the home and
the “curtilage”:
And, therefore, we may safely conclude, that the requisite of it’s [sic]
being domus mansionalis is only in the burglary of a private house; which is the
most frequent, and in which it is indispensably necessary to form it’s [sic]
guilt, that it must be in a mansion or dwelling house. For no distant barn,
warehouse, or the like, are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a
man’s castle of defence: nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no man
resides, and which therefore for the time being are not mansion-houses,
attended with the same circumstances of midnight terror. A house however,
wherein a man sometimes resides, and which the owner hath only left for a
short season, animo revertendi [intending to return], is the object of burglary;
though no one be in it, at the time of the fact committed. And if the barn,
stable, or warehouse be parcel of the mansionhouse, though not under the same roof or
contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privileges
all it’s [sic] branches and appurtenants, if within the curtilage or homestall.55

There are a few points we should note right away about the quotation,
and then we need to back up for context. The first thing to notice is that
Blackstone is clearly talking about buildings in the run up to his invocation of
“curtilage” and “homestall.”56 He is talking about barns, stables, and
warehouses. His question is whether these can be considered part of the
“mansionhouse” if they are not in fact under the same roof as the
mansionhouse or connected to it.57 The second thing we should point out is
the relationship of these buildings to the curtilage. What the curtilage does,
according to the passage, is to designate certain areas of a person’s property

55
56
57

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. (questioning whether barns, stables, and stables are part of the mansionhouse); see also
MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 558 (1736) (“[O]ut-houses, that are parcel thereof, as barn, stable, cow-houses, dairyhouses, if they are parcel of the messuage, . . . [can be subject to] burglary . . . .”).
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within which buildings will not be considered separate from the house, but
as in fact part of the house.
As this Article will term it, this is a conception of the curtilage as a space
rather than a place in its own right. In the context of Blackstone’s interests in
the passage, the curtilage is important because it is by means of the curtilage
that we can pick out the buildings that are rightly considered as branches of
the mansionhouse, and not as separate from it.58 This is made clear from an
earlier remark of Blackstone’s, when he says that “[f]or no distant barn,
warehouse, or the like, are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a
man’s castle of defence.”59 The buildings within the curtilage are important
in comparison to those buildings that are not in the curtilage—those buildings
that are “distant.” Distant barns and warehouses are not part of the home,
even though they are buildings. It is only the buildings within the curtilage
that get to be counted as part of the house. That is the importance—and the
function—of the curtilage. It tells us which buildings are part of the house,
but it does not tell us what land is part of the home. It tells us which buildings
are part of the home. 60
It follows quite naturally from this that the curtilage—i.e., the land
surrounding the house—is not itself part of the house. This seems clear from the
passage.61 It becomes even clearer in the context of the chapter, which deals
with crimes against habitation. In defining those crimes (burglary, arson,
and the like) it is important to answer the prior question of what counts as a
58

59
60

61

As one state court has put this understanding: “Although the subject of burglary at common law
extended to buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling home, the curtilage itself was not protected
apart from its relationship to a building. Only buildings in the curtilage of the dwelling home fell
within the scope of the burglary offense.” State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Iowa 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
The idea that the house may be separated in this way comes from a time when one’s kitchen or
bathroom in fact might be in a different building—rather than a different room—than one’s living
or sleeping areas. See Catherine Hancock, Justice Powell’s Garden: The Ciraolo Dissent and Fourth
Amendment Protection for Curtilage-Home Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 551, 566–67 (2007) (“Those
activities continued in a different form, after the passing of the era when ‘the kitchen, the laundry,
the springhouse, the woodshed, and most particularly the “outhouse”’ were not to be found ‘within
the four walls’ of houses.”). Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule,
56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 952 (2004) (“At common law, the curtilage concept was a boundary within
which structures were granted the same protection under the law of burglary as afforded to the
house itself.”); id. at 952 n.56 (collecting cases making the same point).
Note also how “branches and appurtenants” refer back to the “buildings” in the curtilage and not to
the curtilage (and in this context, is something attached to the building). Further, the logic of the
passage shows how “branches and appurtenants” could not be part of the curtilage, for they are
specified in the passage as within the curtilage rather than the curtilage itself. For more on
appurtenants, and a somewhat contrary view on the matter, see supra note 58.
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person’s house. We need this in order to tell when we have something like a
burglary, as opposed to a trespass or a stealing. Or we may need it to tell
when the crime implicates not just the home but also other places, as when
Blackstone says that arson could be the burning of a home, but also the
burning of a barn full of corn, even if it is not part of the home, or when
burglary could also be breaking into a church even though a church need
not be someone’s home.62 So it is no surprise when Blackstone again defines
“house” when he discusses burglary, and repeats that barns and stables and
dairy houses that adjoin a house can be looked upon as “branches” thereof
but not when these same buildings are “distant” from the home.63 The point
could not be clearer—if the buildings are close to the home, they are part of
the home. It is the feature of being a building close to the home that extends the
boundary of the home, not merely being close to the home. The idea that
the land surrounding the home is also the home does not find any support—
none—in these passages.64 It is an invention borne of a misreading of
Blackstone on burglary.65

62

63
64

65

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *221 (“Not only the bare dwelling house, but all
outhouses that are parcel thereof, though not contiguous thereto, nor under the same roof, as barns
and stables, may be the subject of arson.”). Context here suggests that even if the barn was not
within the curtilage, this would still be arson. The point is that arson extends to buildings that are
not the house, and are not even within the curtilage of the house.
Id. at *225.
Nor, for that matter, does it find support in any other older sources that build on Blackstone:
Many cases may and do arise, in which it can be affirmed, as matter of law, that a given
house or structure is or is not within the curtilage. Curtilage usually includes “the yard, or
garden, or field, which is near to, and used in connection with, the dwelling.” And
Bish., quoting from ancient authors, says: “The privy, barn, stable, cow-houses, dairyhouses, if they are parcel of the messuage, though they are not under the same roof, or
joining or contiguous to it,” are included within the curtilage.
Cook v. State, 3 So. 849, 850 (Ala. 1888) (internal citations omitted).
Cf. Laura L. Krakovec, Fourth Amendment—The Constitutionality of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 602, 607 (1986) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*225) (“The common law views the curtilage as part of the house.”). To the extent that Blackstone
is here summarizing the common law, it is fair to say as well that this interpretation also involves a
misreading of the common law. A court opinion from the 1980s also put this point well, in
rehearsing the common law history:
The curtilage of a dwelling house is a space necessary and convenient, habitually used for
family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employment; the yard, garden or field
which is near to and used in connection with the dwelling. . . . [I]n England the curtilage
seems to have included only the buildings within the inner fence or yard, because there, in
early times, for defense, the custom was to enclose such place with a substantial wall. . . .
[I]n this country, however, such walls or fences, in many cases, do not exist, so that with
us the curtilage includes the cluster of buildings constituting the habitation or dwelling
place, whether enclosed with an inner fence or not.
Wellford v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Va. 1984) (citations omitted) (quoting Bare v.
Commonwealth, 94 S.E. 168, 172 (Va. 1917)).
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Nor is there any help to be found for the idea of curtilage as a special place
in the law of trespass. In Blackstone’s Commentaries, trespass onto land is just
that—trespass onto land.66 It does not matter if the land is close to or far
from the person’s house. The action against the trespasser is the same.67 As
we might put it (in a way that Blackstone could, but does not put it), a trespass
against open fields amounts to the same as if it were a trespass against a
person’s curtilage. Of course, a trespass into a building of a person’s house
could be much more, depending on the facts. It could also be a burglary.68
But a trespass onto a man’s curtilage only cannot be a burglary, even if it is
for the purpose of committing felony at nighttime because the curtilage is not
the house, and it is not even part of the house. For Blackstone, the only things
that can be part of the house are buildings, or more precisely, buildings
within the curtilage.69 Curtilage, again, has only a derivative importance for
Blackstone, as the relevant space for buildings that can be considered part of
the house.70
All of this makes it odd for Blackstone to be relied on for the proposition
that the curtilage is part of the house. The statement used to support that
claim plainly does not say that. The focus at the common law was not on
land but on the buildings on the land.71 Of course, it might be possible to
66

67

68

69
70
71

See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209 (“Every unwarrantable entry on another’s
soil the law entitles a trespass by breaking his close . . . .”); see also id. (“[Trespass] signifies no more
than an entry on another man’s ground without a lawful authority, and doing some damage,
however inconsiderable, to his real property.”).
Nor, it seems, did the right to self-defense mean no duty to retreat from the curtilage, as opposed
to the buildings in the curtilage (i.e., those buildings that Blackstone would call part of the “house”).
See People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 43 (Mich. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (“It is unknown
whether the English common law applied the castle doctrine—which, as we have noted, was
relevant only to the voluntary participant in a nondeadly encounter—to areas beyond the dwelling.
As noted by Professors Perkins and Boyce, ‘the scope of [the] special privilege granted to one so far
at fault might have been limited to the actual building [but this] is mere speculation.’ Because the
only indication we have of the castle doctrine as it applied in Michigan at the time of the codification
of our murder statute is that it applied ‘in the dwelling,’ we lack the authority to now extend this rule
to areas beyond ‘the dwelling’ itself.”).
Some indirect support that the founding generation saw “house” as being applicable only to
buildings can be found in the idea that the evil the Fourth Amendment guarded against was not
merely trespass but a “breaking” into the home. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 642–50 (1999) (describing how the Fourth Amendment
was meant to guard against break-ins rather than merely trespasses).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
Id.
As in the following state court case from Kentucky:
There is a diversity of decision as to what does, and what does not, in law, constitute a part
of a dwelling-house. Some cases include all within the curtilage, and this, according to
Blackstone, appears to have been the common-law rule; while others are made to turn
upon the use. It has been said that burglary may be committed by breaking into a dairy
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update Blackstone, and still get him right, as one federal court did when it
considered the possibility that an “adjoining garage” or a “gazebo where the
kids keep their pool toys” might be protected as part of the “dwelling
house.”72 These, of course, are structures that might be within the curtilage
of the house, and so—under Blackstone—be rightly grouped as part of the
“house.”
It follows that if the Court is using Blackstone as a common-law means
of expanding “house” in the Fourth Amendment then there is a considerable
obstacle—Blackstone does not say what the Court has taken him to be
saying, and the Court has not really offered any other evidence in opinions
to defend its conception of curtilage as house besides Blackstone. But this may
not be fatal to those who would find protection for the “curtilage” in the
Fourth Amendment, and so we should canvass that possibility briefly now,
viz., that the Fourth Amendment also protects a person’s effects, and the
curtilage could be one of a person’s effects.73 This line of argument does not
appear that promising, however.
A recent article by Maureen Brady has suggested that the best reading of
the original meaning of “effects” confines it to personal property, and not to
real property.74 The Court has also rejected a “real property” interpretation
of “effects” interpretation in Oliver, limiting effects to only one’s personal
effects.75 And one can see, perhaps, why the Court did so, especially in an
opinion that was at pains to distinguish the protected curtilage from other
property that is not protected. If “effects” is to be interpreted broadly as to
include the real property one owns, i.e., your land, then we can no longer
make a distinction between property that one owns that is close to one’s

72

73

74

75

or laundry, standing near enough to the dwelling-house to be used as appurtenant to it, or
into such outbuildings as are necessary to it as a dwelling. Also by breaking into a smokehouse opening into the yard of the dwelling-house, and used for its ordinary purposes. And
cases are to be found holding that if an outhouse be so near the dwelling proper that it is
used with it as appurtenant to it, although not within the same inclosure, even, yet burglary
may be committed in it.
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 11 S.W. 209, 210 (Ky. 1889) (internal citations omitted).
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 911 (9th Cir. 2001). It is not clear, however, that the
inclusion of a “yard within the white picket fence” is something Blackstone would have gone along
with. See id.
See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1821, 1886 (2016) (questioning whether a limited reading of “effects” is “interpretively
sound”).
See Maureen E. Brady, The Lost ‘Effects’ of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection,
125 YALE L.J. 946, 985 & n.174 (2016) (citing early sources which equated “effects” with personal
property).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1984). This point is reconsidered in the Conclusion
of this Article.
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house (the curtilage) and property that is far away (open fields). In other
words, if the “home”—now with the correct reading of home as meaning
only the home and buildings nearby—can seem to narrow, opening up
“effects” to mean all owned real property may seem too broad, too expansive
of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. It would mean that any trespass
onto land to seek information could potentially be a “search.” This may be
an appealing option, but it is not one the Court (including its self-identified
originalists) has seemed eager to embrace. The Court has instead chosen to
rest its defense of the idea of curtilage, and the idea that the curtilage is the
house or should be protected in the same way as the house, on its misreading
of Blackstone.76
B. Fictional “Curtilage”: Holmes and Hester
It is of course possible that the “curtilage” can find a foundation outside
of the text of the Fourth Amendment and its itemized list, and in the next
Part we will turn to this possibility. Before that, however, we should note the
opinion by Justice Holmes in Hester, which involves the first invocation of the
now-famous Blackstone passage, although Holmes does not mention the
word “curtilage”—nor even imply it.77 But Holmes does not use Blackstone
the way the modern Supreme Court—and the Supreme Court of the
1980s—used it.78 In fact, he used it in a way consistent with what this Article
takes to be the correct reading of Blackstone. At issue in Hester was whether
revenue officers committed an unlawful, warrantless search when they seized
evidence (a bottle and a jug) of moonshine whisky manufacturing outside of
Hester’s house.79 Holmes seems to offer several overlapping justifications for
why this was not an unlawful search, “even if there had been a trespass” onto

76

77

78
79

It is the rare court case that tries to correct this misreading of Blackstone, although there are some,
as here: “Thus, although the common law unquestionably recognized the concept of ‘curtilage,’ it
did so to enlarge the definition of a dwelling to encompass nearby structures used in conjunction
with the dwelling, so that the invasion of any of them could constitute burglary.” State v. Dixson,
766 P.2d 1015, 1023 (Or. 1988) (internal citations omitted). Dixson also criticizes Holmes on the
curtilage, id. at 1022, but here the court may go too far: Holmes does not use the idea of curtilage,
and, as argued infra, he had no need to do so.
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal
Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986)
(discussing the breadth of the Fourth Amendment argument made in Hester). In general, I agree
with Stephen Saltzburg when he writes “an examination of Hester reveals an opinion that is confined
to specific facts and that hardly addresses the extent to which the fourth amendment covers real
property.” Id.
See Hester, 265 U.S. at 57 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields).
Id. at 58.
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private property (in this case, the home of Hester’s father, where Hester also
lived).80 He first claims that the bottle and the jug were abandoned, so there
could be no unlawful seizure of what was abandoned.81 Holmes then goes
on to say, seemingly apropos of nothing, that the revenue officers found no
relevant incriminating evidence when they did briefly enter the house, so “it
is immaterial to discuss that.”82 We at last get to Holmes’ use of Blackstone,
to rebut what Holmes says is the “only shadow of a ground for bringing up
the case” that this was an unlawful search, viz., that the “examination of the
vessels took place upon Hester’s father’s land.”83 But Holmes in response
says “it is enough” to observe that the Fourth Amendment only protects
people in their persons, houses, papers and effects, and this protection does
not extend to open fields.84 The distinction between the home and open
fields, Holmes says, “is as old as the common law.”85 In support of this, he
cites to Blackstone’s Commentaries, including the page cited repeatedly by the
modern Court (and which was quoted above).
It is important to emphasize what Holmes does not say here; he does not
say that there is a distinction between land that is part of the curtilage and
land that is part of open fields.86 He does not even use the word “curtilage”
in his opinion. Moreover, what is striking to note is that the actions of the
revenue officers in seizing and searching the bottle and jug was done near
the house, and quite possibly within what Blackstone would call the home’s curtilage.87
In terms that the Court would use in Jardines, the officers may have

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
See id. (addressing specific language that Justice Holmes leaves out of his opinion).
See id. at 58. To read Hester as creating the doctrine of curtilage requires a lot of machinations, as
in this passage:
While the Court’s discussion of curtilage in Hester is implicit, it is significant. The Court
states that the only “shadow” of a claim Hester has is that the search may have taken place
on his father’s land, suggesting that such land (or curtilage) would receive some level of
Fourth Amendment protection. The Court then states that no Fourth Amendment
protection is given to open fields, dismissing the idea that the jugs were within the curtilage
of Hester’s father’s land, and recounts the “old” difference between “open fields” and “the
home.” While at first the Court uses the phrase “father’s land” to describe this suggested
protected space, it switches to the word “home” in the conclusion of its opinion. This
substitution of “father’s land” for “home” suggests the Court viewed the two as
interchangeable and equal.
Amelia L. Diedrich, Comment, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the
Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297, 302 (2011).
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committed a “trespass onto the curtilage.”88 But Holmes takes no notice of
this—or does not seem to care whether the officers went into an area
immediately adjoining the home.89 Holmes does not, to put it lightly, seem
interested in expounding on the distinction between curtilage and open
fields, nor how to measure when open fields turn into curtilage.90 Holmes in
Hester only explicitly cites two things at play in the case—the home, which
the officers did not enter into, and open fields, which are not protected by
the Fourth Amendment.91 Holmes says nothing about the “curtilage,” and
indeed it does no work in his opinion.92 From the text of the opinion itself,
the best we can infer is that either Holmes thinks only the home matters and
there is no protection for the curtilage of the home, or Holmes believed that
whatever happened in Hester happened in open fields, and so we do not need
to say anything about the curtilage because it’s simply not in play given the
facts.93 Although Holmes cites to a place where Blackstone mentions it, this
is incidental to his larger point, viz., that open fields are not protected, whether
or not curtilage even exists.94 Indeed, what is most salient to Holmes in Hester

88
89
90

91
92
93

94

The use of curtilage and trespass in Jardines is discussed infra Part III.B.
See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924) (omitting curtilage from the discussion).
As Charles Rogers notes, there seem to be many foundations for Holmes’s decision in Hester, only
one of which relies on the idea of curtilage. Holmes may have based his decision on, inter alia, the
fact that the land was not owned by Hester but by his father; that the property was abandoned; and
the land was not fenced in. See Charles H. Rogers, The Fourth Amendment and Evidence Obtained by a
Government Agent’s Trespass, 42 NEB. L. REV. 166, 170–71 (1962).
See Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 (concluding that open fields are not protected).
See id.
Courts seem to have exaggerated (or simply imagined) the role curtilage plays in Hester. See, e.g.,
DeMontmorency v. State, 401 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“These cases and the
authorities upon which they rely seem without question to extend the legitimate expectation of
privacy to the home and the surrounding area coming within the definition of ‘curtilage.’ Hester v.
United States, supra, clearly distinguishes ‘open fields’ from the home and its ‘curtilage’ . . . .”),
approved, 464 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1985); see also Hearn v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 307-CV-320-J33MCR, 2010 WL 1462365, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“The
concept of curtilage plays a part in determining the reach of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
The Supreme Court used the concept of curtilage in Hester v. United States to distinguish between the
area outside a person’s house which the Fourth Amendment protects, and the open fields, which
are afforded no Fourth Amendment protection. In general, the curtilage is defined as the area
around the home which ‘harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the
privacies of the home.’”), aff’d sub nom. Hearn v. Fla., 410 F. App’x 268 (11th Cir. 2011). Again,
Hester does not even use the word “curtilage,” much less define it.
See Hester, 265 U.S. at 58–59 (discussing the lack of protection for open fields). Saltzburg again has
it about right when he writes the following: “[I]t is possible that all the Court intended to say was
that abandoned property found in an open field may be seized. In short, it is difficult to determine
what the Supreme Court actually intended to say in Hester about open fields and the fourth
amendment.” See Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 8–9.
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is the actual physical home (the “house”), which plays no real role.95 Beyond
the four walls of the home, it is unclear whether any other land gets protected
for Holmes.
The point is this: Holmes at best says nothing about whether curtilage is
protected as part of the home, or whether the space of the curtilage is to be
treated as “open fields.”96 Holmes only distinguishes between the home and
open fields. In other words, Holmes does not use—and does not need to use—anything
like “curtilage” in deciding the case. Holmes did not invent the modern idea of
curtilage, and in fact, he did not even come close. The development of the
concept of curtilage would have to wait nearly sixty years—and it would rely
in great part on a misreading not only of Blackstone, but now also of Holmes,
who would be falsely given the credit for employing the concept of
“curtilage.”97
II. THE INVENTION OF CURTILAGE
What is striking about the revival of the use of the common-law categories
of “curtilage” and “open fields” by the 1980s Supreme Court is that, between
Hester and Oliver, the Supreme Court moved to the more expansive Katz test
for defining privacy in the Fourth Amendment context. Katz was far from a
textualist, original-meaning decision.98 Katz had the feeling of moving
outside of the constraints of the text, and beyond rigid categories of where
and what was protected toward a more flexible standard.99 Katz meant that

95

96
97

98

99

See Fernand N. Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court’s Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth
Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1971) (criticizing Holmes on this score and
suggesting that trespass onto land should have done more work in the opinion); see id. at 5 (“There
is no adequate discussion [in Hester] of why a trespass on land by federal officers might not constitute
the same kind of violation of one’s security under the amendment as would a trespass which involves
a wall of some sort.”).
See id. Of course, Blackstone also says nothing about “open fields.”
Ironically, in a case decided in 1921, the Court did correctly use the concept of curtilage, when it
found a constitutional violation of a “defendant’s house and store within his curtilage.” Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314 (1921). Curtilage here means clearly a space where buildings are,
and not a place in its own right. Moreover, the store being within the curtilage, it would count as
part of the home (as the Court implicitly concluded it was). Id. at 314–15.
As Justice Thomas said in Carpenter, “[t]he Katz test has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth
Amendment.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 2338. (“The most glaring problem with this test is that it has ‘no plausible foundation
in the text of the Fourth Amendment.’”); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (dismissing the Katz test as “self-indulgent,” “unhelpful,” and with “no plausible
foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment”).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people—
and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach
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the Fourth Amendment would “travel”—and especially travel outside of the
home.100 We did not need to look to the text to define privacy, and be limited
to what the text said was protected—we could look, more widely, to personal
and societal expectations of privacy. Privacy could be found in a phone
booth, or in a bathroom.101 It seemed to follow, then, that we did not need
to resort to common law concepts like the curtilage, or for that matter, open
fields. We would have to look and see what society thought about these places.
If society reasonably expected privacy in the curtilage, it would be
protected—it did not need the imprimatur of Blackstone to get that
protection (at best, Blackstone would be redundant, as just confirming the
expectations we already knew we had).102 Even under the Katz test, however,
the home remained special, but now for different, less formal, and maybe
more compelling reasons. The home was special because it was where we
could most expect privacy and where society was most willing to recognize
it, and not (or not only) because it was in the text or that Blackstone thought
the home was important.
A. The Making of the Modern Myth of Curtilage: Oliver
Given the non-textualist and non-originalist emphasis of Katz, it is
somewhat strange to see the Court in Oliver relying heavily on what it takes
the common law meaning of “open fields” and “curtilage” to be and focusing
on what the text protects, rather than what our expectations of privacy are.103
One can make some sense of it as trying to reconcile the two approaches and
see how they overlap and reinforce one another. The way it does so,
however, is also strange, as it has to go to great lengths to read protection for

100
101

102

103

of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”).
As the majority opinion famously put it, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
See David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal
Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008) (discussing the origins of the Katz test as potentially
being in a series of cases involving police spying into bathrooms).
As appeared to have been the consensus view prior to Oliver:
The view of most courts appears to have been that Katz rendered the open fields doctrine
obsolete, perhaps through redundancy: if the ultimate criterion of fourth amendment
analysis is the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, finding that a search or
seizure had been carried out in the “open field” could be considered equivalent to the
conclusion that the area was so far removed from a residence (in either distance or purpose)
that no legitimate expectation of privacy could attach.
Curran, supra note 40, at 402.
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176, 180–81, 183–84 (1984) (discussing common law
interpretations of open fields).

774

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:3

the curtilage into Hester and into Blackstone. And what is most interesting
for our purposes, is that Oliver brings “curtilage” into the lexicon of the Fourth
Amendment without needing to.104 In Oliver, the Court holds that the
property involved in the two consolidated cases (Oliver and Thornton) was in
fact “open fields,” and so the defendants had no protection at all—both
because open fields are not textually protected places under the Fourth
Amendment and because society is not prepared to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in open fields.105 Just as in Hester, curtilage need not
be involved at all—the Court needed only to decide that the police activity
did not take place in the home but instead in “open fields.”106 The opinion
in Oliver takes the opportunity nonetheless to invent the modern idea of
curtilage as its own constitutionally protected place and to give it a basis in the
Fourth Amendment.107
The invention took two moves to complete. The first move was to show
how the textualist approach and the reasonable expectation of privacy
approach are not really at odds with one another when it comes to open
fields. Open fields are not in the text, so they are not protected, nor can it
be said that we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields under
the more generous Katz test. In other words, the failure of the text to protect
open fields is not a problem from the standpoint of our expectations of
privacy—we do not need the protection to be in the text, because it is not
something we would expect to have private. But it is in the process of making
this point that the Court began to subtly sneak in the idea of curtilage. Citing
Hester, the Court reaffirmed the idea that we “may not legitimately demand
privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding the home.”108 Hester, of course, said no such thing about
the area surrounding the home being protected, as we have seen.109 Hester at
most stood for the proposition that the home is different from open fields—
that the home is protected and open fields are not.110

104
105
106
107

108
109
110

See id.
See id.
As the Court admits in a footnote, “Neither petitioner Oliver nor respondent Thornton has
contended that the property searched was within the curtilage.” Id. at 180 n.11.
See Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943,
953–54 (2004) (“[N]ot until dictum in Oliver v. United States was there any suggestion that the
curtilage yard was included within the Fourth Amendment’s purview.”).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding
that Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to open fields).
See Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
See id.
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This brings us to the Court’s second move, which again relied on a
misreading of Hester. Justice Holmes in Hester, the Court said, observed that
the common law distinguished open fields from curtilage, or the land
“immediately surrounding and associated with the home.”111 This again
reads way too much into what Holmes did, and what he needed to do to
decide Hester. Holmes did of course cite Blackstone, and Blackstone made
the distinction between open fields and curtilage, but Holmes did not bring
attention to it in his opinion—and as we have seen, he did not even have to
use the idea of curtilage at all in reaching his decision.112 But this is not all
the Court misconstrued. Blackstone’s distinction between the home and the
curtilage, the Court wrote, “implies that only the curtilage, not the
neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that
attach to the home.”113 But Blackstone did not say this. What the curtilage
implies—in fact, what it does—is tell us what buildings are part of the house.
A better reading of what Blackstone “implies” is that the buildings in the
curtilage are part of the home, and so the Fourth Amendment protections
attach to them as well as the “mansionhouse.”114 Still, these combined
misreadings—of Holmes and Blackstone—are what formally introduced
“curtilage” into the Fourth Amendment. What is worse, the Court suggested
that curtilage has a double pedigree—it is supported by the text (because the
home includes the curtilage) and by our reasonable expectations (because we
use the curtilage for intimate activities associated with the home).
In fact, on closer inspection, both justifications fall flat, as the dissent ably
sets out. For one, “curtilage” just like “open fields” is not mentioned in the
Fourth Amendment—and it is neither a person’s house nor one of his
effects.115 As a result, as the dissent pointedly remarks, “the Court’s reading
of the plain language of the Fourth Amendment is incapable of explaining
even its own holding in this case.”116 The best basis for the curtilage would
be if it was in fact part of the house, but the Court relies on Hester for the idea

111
112

113
114
115

116

See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (citing Hester, 265 U.S. at 59).
See Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 (explaining that “it is enough to say that . . . the special protection accorded
by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ is not
extended to the open fields”).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 185–86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (addressing the majority’s contention that
real property outside of the curtilage is not protected under the Fourth Amendment). The
Conclusion reconsiders the “effects” point, infra.
Id. at 186.
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of “curtilage”—which, as we have seen, is not in Hester at all.117 The other
option is to make the curtilage part of the “effects” protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but the majority also rejects this option.118 That leaves the best
defense of curtilage to be in the expectations of privacy we bring to it. Even
granting that this may be the case with curtilage, it does not explain why
open fields should never come with any reasonable expectations of privacy,
the dissent says.119 The problem is, as the dissent argues, “curtilage” and
“open fields” under the Katz test are just labels—because they are not in the
text, they do not get automatic protection, so if they want that protection,
they have to earn it.120 We have to say, in other words, why curtilage always
gets protected under the Fourth Amendment, but open fields never do. It
cannot be—under the Katz test—that “open fields” deserve no privacy
protection, because that just begs the question: why are you calling these
fields “open” rather than “curtilage”?121 The same thing goes with
curtilage—you cannot say this land deserves protection because it is
curtilage. We have to ask the question, why are we calling this land curtilage
in the first place?
The Court in Oliver by and large dodges the question of how curtilage is
defined, saying that it is a “familiar one easily understood from our daily
experience.”122 This is a dodge the Court would use repeatedly in the years
to come. But it is a dodge the Court cannot use if it is defining curtilage in
terms of expectations of privacy, because again, we cannot say that “this land
is protected because it is curtilage” because that is the conclusion of the
argument, not its starting point.123 The Katz reasonable expectation of
117
118
119
120

121

122
123

See id. at 176–77 (majority opinion) (explaining that “the term ‘effects’ is less inclusive than ‘property’
and cannot be said to encompass open fields”).
See id.
See id. at 186 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s incomplete analysis of Fourth
Amendment protection).
See id. at 187–88 (noting that something is not covered by the Fourth Amendment merely because
it is a house or effect, but a claimant must show a reasonable expectation of privacy that has been
violated).
See Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 12 (“[T]he language of Katz certainly does not suggest that all fields
(or all areas of any sort) are completely outside the reach of the fourth amendment. Instead, the
language of Katz seems to suggest that the focus is on whether an individual seeks to keep private
and unexposed the things that are his or hers.”).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12 (majority opinion).
See United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985, 992 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Arboleda likewise is not helped
by invocation of the hoary concept of ‘curtilage[.’] Terming a particular area curtilage expresses a
conclusion; it does not advance Fourth Amendment analysis. The relevant question is the one
surveyed above, whether the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area.”). In
other words, under Katz, saying a piece of land is protected because it is curtilage is tantamount to
saying, “we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this land because we have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.”
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privacy test protects places that people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in, and saying that a curtilage is protected because people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it replaces argument with a label.
Getting protection under the Katz test means actually going through that test
and saying why this piece of land deserves protection qua curtilage, rather
than saying that this is curtilage—because we know it when we see it—and
therefore deserves protection. On the Katz test, the label “curtilage” should
have no independent force. Nor can we get around that by saying that we
“easily understand” what curtilage is. We have to say why our expectations
of privacy in that place which we “easily understand” to be curtilage are
reasonable.
B. Doubling Down: Dunn and Beyond
The emptiness of the label “curtilage” is a point that the Court slowly
came to recognize in Dunn, and which it worked to remedy by holding that
“curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference” to certain
factors which—it believed—showed that it was reasonable to expect privacy
there, in the “curtilage” of a home.124 Relying on the mistaken reading of
Hester given in Oliver, Dunn said that the Court had recognized that “the
Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house” but Dunn went on to
say that “the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon
whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question
should be treated as the home.”125 There is no awareness here that curtilage
is not an “area” that deserves protection in its own right, but only picks out
those buildings—including barns—that can be included as part of the
home.126
But it is in setting out a multi-factor test for what “land” gets Fourth
Amendment protection as part of the “home” that the emptiness of curtilage
is laid bare. If curtilage is determined by factors related to the reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area then we do not need the label; we do not
need to see if this thing is curtilage or not, because what matters is whether
we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area.127 And if we do
124
125
126

127

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
See id. at 300 (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180).
See id. at 296 (holding that the building in question laid “outside the curtilage of the house”).
Ironically, Dunn dealt with a barn, which is a building that may or may not be in someone’s
curtilage.
See id. at 300 (“[T]he central component of this inquiry [i]s whether the area harbors the ‘intimate
activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”). One might think
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have an expectation of privacy in that place, we should be able to explain the
reasons why that expectation in this place is reasonable.128 Insofar as we give
“curtilage” any independent meaning, we are making a mistake—the Katz
test cannot “attach Fourth Amendment significance to curtilage per se, only
to the reasonable expectation of privacy that might occur with reference to
it.”129 Under the Katz test, rightly understood, labels like curtilage and open
fields should have no intrinsic meaning. It follows that “curtilage” can have
no categorical across-the-board meaning, because whether something is
curtilage—that is to say, whether we have a reasonable expectation of
privacy around it—will depend on a case-by-case analysis, which is precisely
what Oliver said it was rejecting.130 To the extent curtilage makes sense, it
makes sense only on the reasonable expectation of privacy test, but that is
because any place could be protected under that test—a phone booth, a
bathroom, and even the area “immediately adjoining the house,” i.e., the
curtilage. But this is because of the nature of the test, and not because of
anything intrinsic to the curtilage.131
The upshot of Dunn, then, should have been the use of the concept of
“curtilage” in only this superficial way—as a way of drawing attention to the
fact that some area had been found to be a place where society was prepared
to view a person’s expectation of privacy as “reasonable.” It is perhaps for
this reason that when curtilage again pops up as doing real work in Jardines,
it is the textualist meaning that is used—the idea that curtilage is protected
because it is protected explicitly in the text of the Fourth Amendment, because curtilage

128
129
130

131

that the “proximity” part of the Dunn analysis is objective, or at least objective enough. But
proximity is (first of all) not the whole story—some land that is proximate is not curtilage—and of
course, we still have to answer, how close is close enough (“proximate” enough) for it to be
“curtilage”?
See also Curran, supra note 40, at 414 (highlighting the inevitability of case-by-case analysis of
curtilage in determining whether a place is used for intimate activities).
United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 258 (2d Cir. 2006).
See Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 14 (“Part III of the opinion in Oliver ends with the Court’s rejection
of a case-by-case approach to fields as unworkable. Nowhere does the Court recognize that officers
will have to decide case-by-case whether they are invading the curtilage and that reviewing courts
will have to decide whether the officers’ decisions are reasonable.”). The following quote highlights
an additional concern of the Court:
Oliver rightfully noted that an ad hoc approach to determining whether a particular area
was entitled to constitutional protection would not only make it difficult for police to
discern the scope of their authority, but would also perpetuate a danger that constitutional
rights would be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced. Yet, this case-by-case approach is
exactly what has been promulgated by the Dunn decision.
Rownaghi, supra note 15, at 1179–80.
After all, the idea of a bathroom is also one familiar and easily understood from our everyday
experience!
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is part of the “home.”132 By now the moves should be familiar, and they all
stem from the misreading of Blackstone. Bootstrapping off what Hester does
say about the distinction from the common law between the “home” and
“open fields,” Justice Scalia writes that the “identity” of the home and the
curtilage is also as old as the common law, and cites Blackstone.133 But
(again) this is mistaken. Blackstone did not identify the curtilage and the
home. What is as old as the common law (in fact, what is the common law)
is the identity of the mansionhouse and the buildings—the barn, the outhouse,
and other buildings and appurtenances—that are contained in the curtilage.134
For good measure, Justice Scalia adds that in the area close to the home,
privacy expectations are most heightened—but this is to mix Katz-type
reasoning into the textualist account he clearly wants to give of the
curtilage.135 Justice Scalia closes by saying that the scope of the curtilage is,
as Oliver has said, “easily understood from daily experience.”136 Finally, and
in the process almost giving the game up, Justice Scalia appeals to Entick v.
Carrington, which did not talk in terms of curtilage at all, but rather trespass
onto any part of a person’s “close,” or property—a point which would apply
to trespass onto any real property, not just the curtilage.137 It is not clear that

132

133
134

135

136
137

See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (“We therefore regard the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’”).
See id. at 6–7 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223, *225).
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (explaining that areas “within the curtilage”
are protected components of the home). Justice Scalia only achieves the equivalence of the curtilage
and the home by slicing and dicing the relevant passage from Blackstone.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7 (highlighting the principle of higher privacy expectations in the
immediate area surrounding the home as having “ancient and durable roots”). Justice Scalia’s bow
to Katz is interesting, given his general mistrust of Katz even before United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400 (2012). For more discussion, see Chad Flanders & Ashlyn Dowd, The Fourth Amendment of
“Things”: Comment on Toksen, 59 WASHBURN L.J. 87 (2020).
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984)).
See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (KB) (proclaiming that agents of the
government may not enter private property unless authorized by law). As one treatise summarizes
the point:
The broad principle here is that which derives from Entick v. Carrington, namely that every
invasion of private property, however slight, is a trespass and that no person has the right to
enter and search except by consent or in accordance with some lawful authorisation [sic].
It follows that every search of private property by a police officer is unlawful unless it is
capable of justification by reference to some recognised and accepted legal ground [i.e.,
warrant, statute, or exigency].
POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW 260 (1982)
(emphasis added). The exact quote from Entick is:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon
his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no
damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law. . . .
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Justice Scalia really advances any genuinely new arguments in favor of the
curtilage, rather than relying on past opinions and our intuitions about what
ought to be protected.138
What may make Jardines less egregious as a practical matter is that it
involved a trespass onto the porch of a house, which is more a part of the
house than simply the area surrounding the house.139 It might be
“appurtenant” to the home, to use Blackstone’s term.140 Still, the weakness

138

139
140

[T]here is no law in this country to justify the defendants [messengers of the King] in what
they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society. . . .
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817.
There is a further argument that Justice Scalia makes in passing, which deserves mention, as Justice
Sotomayor will refer back to it—again in passing—in her majority opinion in Collins. See Collins v.
Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018) (concluding that the driveway enclosure in this case “is
properly considered curtilage”). And it may be novel, at least in the mouth of Justice Scalia. Justice
Scalia says that the protection that the home gives “would be of little practical value if the State’s
agents could stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right
to retreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man’s property to observe
his repose from just outside the front window.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6. It is unclear exactly what
the argument here is, even if we grant the premise (which seems debatable) that the practical value
of the protection of the home would be vastly diminished if the curtilage were not protected. Is
Justice Scalia inferring that the Founders must have meant the curtilage to be protected as the home
because otherwise the value of the home would be diminished? Or is he offering the prophylactic
value of the curtilage as a separate argument for protecting the curtilage as a Fourth Amendment
matter?
Given Justice Scalia’s other commitments, it may be best to see this point as simply indicating that
the Founder’s understanding of the curtilage as including the home (an interpretation this Article
has disputed) was wise. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that Justice Scalia was a skeptic of
such “prophylactic” arguments for expanding rights-protections in other criminal procedure
contexts. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s
extension of the Edwards prohibition is the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis,
producing a veritable fairyland castle of imagined constitutional restriction upon law
enforcement.”). The prophylactic argument is addressed in more detail in the context of Justice
Sotomayor’s presentation of the argument in Collins. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3–4 ( “We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's
porch to investigate the contents of the home is a ‘search’ . . . .”).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. A few lower courts have dealt with the problem
of trying to figure out what is “appurtenant” to a home. In State v. Pace, the court found that a step
or stoop would be an appurtenance to the home, although it also—citing an earlier case—added
that a driveway was “appurtenant” to a home. The Pace court seemed open in its admission that
including the driveway as appurtenant to the home was a rather “broad” understanding of what
could count as appurtenant. See State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 1999) (“More recently,
in Baker, we concluded a driveway fell within the definition of ‘appurtenance to a building or
structure.’ We found a driveway was an ‘appurtenance’ because it was closely associated with and
connected to buildings and structures, and was built to enhance the use and enjoyment of the
building or structure.”). For a better understanding of appurtenant, see, e.g., Searle v. Town of
Bucksport, 3 A.3d 390, 399–400 (Me. 2010) (Jabar, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (“As
the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary establishes, an object may be appurtenant to
a building either because it ‘belongs to’ it or because it is ‘attached to’ it.”).
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of the textualist argument seems plain. As the dissent observed in Oliver,
curtilage is not mentioned in the text of the Fourth Amendment.141 Nor, as
we saw, can it be fairly read into Blackstone that the curtilage was considered
part of the home, rather than simply a place where other parts of the home (i.e.,
buildings) could be located.142 And if we move away from the textualist
foundation for curtilage, the use of the label curtilage becomes dispensable—
it becomes a way of stating a conclusion (that here people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy) that has been reached on other grounds. It takes
some work to excavate these flaws, to get to the bottom of them. But once
we see them, it becomes obvious that “curtilage” is a place that has been
invented by the Court. It has been invented by the textualist as somehow
contained in the Fourth Amendment, even though curtilage is never
mentioned there, and the common-law history does not support the
“identity” of home and curtilage. Curtilage has also been “invented”—
perhaps less questionably—by those who favor the reasonable expectation of
privacy test as a shorthand for the factors that go into making something a
place where we can reasonably expect privacy. In either case, the idea that
curtilage gets special Fourth Amendment protection qua curtilage is a fiction,
an invention.143
III. THE APOTHEOSIS OF CURTILAGE: COLLINS
All of this background is largely beneath the surface in Collins, the Court’s
most recent engagement with the concept of curtilage.144 The facts of the
case are simple. Officers had reason to believe that a motorcycle that had
repeatedly been speeding was parked in the driveway of a house.145 Upon
seeing the motorcycle, Officer David Rhodes did not get a warrant, but
instead walked “up to the top of the driveway” and, “investigat[ing] further,”
pulled a tarp that had been placed over the vehicle.146 Looking up the vehicle
identification number of the motorcycle, Rhodes determined that the

141
142
143

144
145
146

See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s holding is incorrect
because curtilage is not covered by the Fourth Amendment).
See discussion supra Part I.
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1283, 1287 (2014) (“Curtilage has long been understood as a legal fiction that expands the
protection of the home beyond the formal structures of the house.”).
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018) (holding that the partially enclosed top driveway
of a home was curtilage for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Id. at 1668.
Id.
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motorcycle was stolen.147 Shortly after, Rhodes arrested Collins, who was a
resident of the house (his girlfriend’s), and who admitted that he stole the
vehicle.148 Collins lost a motion to suppress the search of the vehicle.149 The
state’s court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, and so
did the Virginia Supreme Court.150 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to answer the question whether—as the Virginia Supreme
Court had held—the automobile exception made the warrantless search of
the vehicle permissible. The Supreme Court, 8–1, in a decision by Justice
Sotomayor, said it did not.151
What seems remarkable about this case is about how little (if you buy the
premises of the majority) it has to do with the automobile exception, except
perhaps to confirm that the exception “only extends” as far as the vehicle
itself.152 If one grants that the motorcycle was on the curtilage, and the
curtilage is the same as the house, both of which the majority presumes
without much in the way of argument, the conclusion that this is a search,
and an unlawful search, because it trespasses into the “home,” follows almost
immediately. Indeed, the case becomes an extremely easy one, as Justice
Sotomayor emphasizes when she asks the reader to consider a “slightly
different factual scenario,” where the search occurs not in the driveway of
the house, but inside the home, where a vehicle happens to be parked.153 “Can
the officer, acting without a warrant, enter the house to search the
motorcycle and confirm whether it is the right one?”154 “Surely not,” she
answers.155 For Justice Sotomayor, the Collins case is like the motorcycle-inthe-living-room case in every relevant respect. Where one might invade the
sanctity of the home, the other just as surely invades what Justice Sotomayor
calls the “sanctity of the curtilage.”156 One can see in that final phrase just
how far the curtilage doctrine has come. The curtilage does not merely gain
147
148
149
150
151
152

153

154
155
156

Id.
Id. at 1668–69.
Id. at 1669.
Id.
Id. at 1675.
Kerr anticipated this before the decision was handed down. See Orin S. Kerr, A Few Thoughts on
Collins v. Virginia, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Jan. 3, 2018, 6:00 AM, https://reason.com/2018/
01/03/a-few-thoughts-on-collins-v-virginia/printer (“The Court should reject the application of
the automobile exception as a justification to approach the car.”).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 (“Applying the relevant legal principles to a slightly different factual
scenario confirms this is an easy case. Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of a
house, visible through window to a passerby on the street.”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1672.
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its importance by being sheltered under the home’s “umbrella.”157 It has its
own intrinsic specialness, its own “sanctity.”
We have to retrace Justice Sotomayor’s steps to see how she gets to her
conclusion, because we can question her opinion at each step. Most
significantly, we can question whether her articulation of the nature of the
curtilage—both the justification for protecting it and in defining its scope—
can support the strong conclusion she ends up making. For the very first step
she makes is to assert that the curtilage is part of the home, relying in part on
Justice Scalia’s articulation of the curtilage in Jardines.158 This borrowing
from Justice Scalia seems most noticeable in Justice Sotomayor’s emphasis
on giving full effect to the Fourth Amendment protection of the home by
protecting the curtilage.159 Justice Sotomayor says that protecting curtilage
is necessary, and has been held as part of the home, in part to give “full
practical effect” to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home.160 This
is perhaps best understood as a kind of prophylactic defense of the curtilage,
as a protection necessary to fully guard the home’s right to privacy.161 So for
“Fourth Amendment purposes,” Justice Sotomayor says, guardedly, the
curtilage is part of the home.162

157

158
159

160

161

162

The language here is borrowed from Dunn:
We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when
mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions.
Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case,
they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—whether the area in question is so
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s “umbrella” of
Fourth Amendment protection.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)).
See id. (explaining that deeming curtilage to be part of the home for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment is necessary “[t]o give full practical effect to that right”); see also Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6
(“This right would be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or
side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to retreat would be significantly
diminished if the police could enter a man’s property to observe his repose from just outside the
front window.”).
See Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (“To give full practical effect to that right, the Court considers
curtilage—‘the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”’—to be ‘part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’”).
See Kerr, supra note 24 (defending curtilage as creating “a sort of buffer around the home to make
sure the home is fully protected fro[m] observation”). Whatever the merits of the argument as a
general matter, it is hard to see it as applying to the facts in Collins. The officers were not “trawling”
on the driveway in order to look into the house; they were trawling on the driveway to look at
something (a motorcycle) in the driveway.
Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670.
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Here curtilage does appear as sort of a pale copy of the home, a kind of
“penumbra” of the home,163 not quite deserving of protection in its own right
but getting a kind of borrowed luster from being close to the home. It does
not seem to do justice to Justice Sotomayor’s later characterization of the
curtilage as having its own kind of “sacredness.”164 It is left, then, to Justice
Thomas to cite Blackstone for the idea that the curtilage deserves protection
because it actually is the home. That citation, as we have repeatedly seen, is
misleading, if not plainly mistaken. And here we can see the dilemma set out
in the prior part. Either curtilage needs to be found in the home, as simply
and definitionally included in the home (something we cannot do), or
curtilage does not really exist as an independent concept. If the curtilage is
important because, as Justice Sotomayor says, we also do “home-like” things
there and can expect privacy there, it is because of these things that it gets
protection (under Katz), not because we call it “curtilage.”
There is a further problem with the way Justice Sotomayor sets out the
curtilage, as sort of an extra level of protection we give to the home, because
home-like “intimate activities” can spill out onto the curtilage.165 This fact—
for Justice Sotomayor—simply means that we can and should expect privacy
in our curtilage. The argument here is Katz-ian, and so we should ask
whether it is right that the driveway is a place where we have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, in a way similar to the expectation of privacy we have
in our homes. Initially, we should wonder whether a driveway always has this
character.166 It may be obvious that a front porch is close enough—adjacent
enough—to the home to get a kind of spillover from the home itself. But a
driveway? Justice Sotomayor says, quoting Jardines, that the driveway here
was adjacent to the home, and was an area “to which the activity of home
163
164

165

166

René Reyes, in the course of providing helpful feedback, deserves the credit for coming up with this
term in this context.
Nor does it seem to offer any additional, substantive reason to protect the curtilage. It is really a
Katz argument, but an indirect one. We have a greater expectation of privacy right outside the
home, because that is a place where it is more likely that people will be able to see (or hear or smell)
things going on in the home, where we have the greatest expectation of privacy.
The idea that the curtilage is associated with “intimate activities” is taken from Boyd—via Oliver—
which as one commentator has noted, is an opinion that does not mention curtilage:
The Court’s second move used language from Boyd, a case that never mentions curtilage,
to define the curtilage as “the area to which extends the intimate activities associated with
the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life’ and therefore has been considered
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” This modern curtilage was then
defined as an “area immediately adjacent to the home.”
Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 956–
57 (2004).
See id. at 958 & n.94 (explaining that courts have disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s contention that
activity of home life extends to the driveway for Fourth Amendment purposes).
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life extends.”167 This is not obvious. Is driving part of the activity of the home?
If the car was parked on the curb, we would not say that the home’s activity
extended in that instance to the street—such observations are what drives
Justice Alito’s dissent.168 It is not even clear that we can say, in general,
driveways are used for home-like activities, absent a better idea of what is
meant by the “activity of home life.” Here we get back to the Dunn problem.
If curtilage is not this obvious thing that we can mark out easily in every case,
and which is not protected just by virtue of the Constitution’s text itself, then
we seem stuck with a sort of case-by-case assessment of what the curtilage is
being used for (along with where it is, which is what Justices Sotomayor and
Scalia mostly rely on) to justify the fact that our expectations of privacy in
that area are reasonable. Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning seems to be that
because it is close to the house, the driveway is an area of “home activity” or a
place of “families and personal privacy.” This does not follow.169
One recalls here Justice Scalia’s invocation of the firm and bright line at
the entrance to the home that he drew in Kyllo,170 and which he seemingly departs
from in Jardines.171 The driveway in this case shows no such bright line.
Indeed, in order to get to the home, a person would have to walk up the
167
168
169

170

171

Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7).
See id. at 1682 (Alito, J., dissenting) (maintaining that privacy interests when a vehicle is parked in a
driveway of home are no greater than when the vehicle is parked in the street just a few feet away).
We might also here mention the Court’s point in Greenwood, which was that we know that people are
going to go through our trash if we leave it out on the sidewalk. See California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding that the search and seizure of garbage for collection outside the
curtilage of the home does not require a warrant). By the same token, do we not know that all sorts
of uninvited people will come trundling onto our curtilage—including our driveway? And of
course, one might put one’s trash on one’s driveway for the garbage man to pick up. See
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 580 N.E.2d 1014, 1016–17 (Mass. 1991) (citations omitted)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 466 N.E.2d 85, 87–88 (Mass. 1984); State v. Corbett, 516
P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)) (“In Simmons, as in the case at bar, the automobile was parked
in a private driveway; the driveway and the automobile on it were clearly visible from a public way;
the driveway was the normal route by which to approach the front door of the residence; no
intrusion into the automobile was required; there was a garage at the end of the driveway, but the
defendant did not use it; and the owner of the automobile had taken no other steps to conceal the
parked automobile from public view. ‘A driveway is only a semi-private area.’ ‘In the course of
urban life, we have come to expect various members of the public to enter upon such a driveway
. . . . If one has a reasonable expectation that various members of society may enter the property
in their personal or business pursuits, he should find it equally likely that the police will do so.’”).
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“That line, we think, must be not only firm but
also bright . . . .”). This is also in conflict with Justice Scalia’s defense of the curtilage as a buffer
that gives added protection to the home. There is a clear line we can draw at the boundary of the
home, even without protecting the area immediately around the home; moreover, that clear line is
one that the Constitution itself draws. The same cannot be said of the curtilage.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7 (invoking curtilage and describing a front porch as a “constitutionally
protected area”).
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driveway—so at least part of the driveway in Collins was not something that
was the same as going inside of someone’s house.172 The home, precisely
because it is something bounded, does seem like something we can easily
mark out in every case.173 Curtilage seems, by contrast, to require by its
nature a case-by-case measuring, which makes it seem more amenable to a
kind of multi-factor analysis, as Dunn eventually came around to; it is not
something that in every case we can define simply by reference to everyday
experience. All of which brings us back, in a way, to Blackstone—Blackstone
did see the lines of the home as in fact firm and bright, because they in every
case were boundaries marked by the walls of buildings, either the
mansionhouse itself or the buildings that could be found in the curtilage.174
There is a disconnect, then, between Justice Sotomayor’s strong
conclusion about Collins—that this is an easy case, that this is just as if the
vehicle had been in the home—and the justifications offered for it. Those
justifications, including the idea that the curtilage is part of the home and is
capable of an easy definition, are weak—a point which should not surprise
us. The justifications for the concept of curtilage as its own place were always
weak. The curtilage is a space, not a place. It is not part of the home, but at
best a space outside the home that can tell us what other buildings might be
part of the home. Nor does invocation of the concept of curtilage have any
talismanic power so that we can simply decide that something is curtilage
and—in the same breath—decide that any place designated as curtilage
automatically has a reasonable expectation of privacy built into it. Justice
Sotomayor, by her hedging references to the “practical” nature of the
curtilage, is more honest about this weakness than perhaps Justice Scalia was.
As her opinion goes on, this diffidence fades, and the curtilage become firmly
established as a constitutionally protected area. This, again, is a fiction.

172

173

174

Kerr raises similar skeptical questions about driveways:
For example, imagine the more routine case of a car parked in a driveway in front of
a house. Maybe the car is parked in front of an attached garage, or perhaps it is in
front of a detached garage some yards from the house. Should that be an easy
curtilage issue under Collins, or should it get a complex 4-factor analysis under Dunn?
Is Collins just about the special case of a space enclosed by walls right up to the house
that happens to be a driveway, or is it a general ruling that applies to driveways?
Kerr, supra note 24.
See Brendan Peters, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943,
944 (2004) (“One can imagine that the house, as mentioned in the Constitution, might have a clear
boundary—ending at the threshold between inside and outside.”).
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (“[T]he capital house protects and privileges
all it’s [sic] branches and appurtenants, if within the curtilage or homestall.”).
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Justice Alito, in his dissent, objects to the majority’s invocation of
curtilage, but he agrees with the majority more than he disagrees.175 He
agrees that the curtilage is part of the home, because the home is not “limited
to the structure in which a person lives.”176 Where Justice Alito departs from
the majority is that, although he believes a search occurred, he thinks the
search was reasonable.177 But this means conceding one of the more
controversial points in the majority opinion—that the home does include the
curtilage and that the driveway was part of the curtilage. Justice Alito is
surely right in this regard: it does seem a stretch to say that the search here is
exactly like a search in the home. At the same time, if Justice Alito agrees that
the curtilage is the house under the Fourth Amendment, then it gets hard for
him to say how the intrusion in this case is any less worrisome than any
intrusion into the actual home itself. Once we make the move that home
and curtilage are identical, then we are really just saying that an intrusion
into the driveway is the same as an intrusion into the garage which is the
same as an intrusion into the actual home itself. They are all intrusions into
the “house” as understood by the Fourth Amendment. Justice Alito’s
opinion seems to sputter on this point near the end. At oral argument, the
Commonwealth of Virginia did not do much better, although it was arguably
more consistent than Justice Alito was, contemplating that perhaps the
automobile exception might license going into someone’s home in order to
search an automobile parked inside!178
There is a different, and more textually based way, to get to the
conclusion of the majority, and it is interestingly one anticipated by
Blackstone himself. Blackstone, as this Article has repeatedly argued, would
not have seen the space outside of the house as equivalent or identical to the
home itself. He may have thought the curtilage deserved some protection,
but that was not because the curtilage was the home—only buildings within
the curtilage could be considered part of the home. So, when Officer Rhodes

175
176
177
178

See generally Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1680–83 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1681.
See id. at 1680 (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable’ searches. What the police did in
this case was entirely reasonable.”).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Collins, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (No. 16-1027):
JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, does—does that mean you, without a warrant, that you always
have access to a place if there’s a reason that you can seize something that you might find
within the place?
MR. COX: I’m hesitant to speak beyond the automobile exception, but I think the
automobile exception would give you that, that ability, unless there was some other rule
that prevented you from doing it, such as a rule that the automobile exception does not
apply in the house.
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walked up the driveway, he was not invading the home.179 Nor did he break
into any building—certainly not the home of Collins himself. But what the
Officer did do was to remove the tarp on the motorcycle. This was not a
search of the automobile; Justice Sotomayor was right in this. The
automobile exception applies only as far as the vehicle itself, and not to the
removal of things on top of the vehicle. So we have a search that is not
covered by that exception, and for which Officer Rhodes did not have a
warrant.180 Moreover, it is a search of a constitutionally protected area—the
vehicle is an effect, in the uncontroversial sense of being a person’s private
property.181 Now, there may be a problem with Collins’ standing to make a
motion, given that he stole the vehicle.182 If the vehicle was his, however, he
would have that standing, and he should win a motion to suppress—not
because of the trespass on to his real property—into his home or his
curtilage—but because of the trespass onto his personal property (the lifting
of the tarp) for the purpose of obtaining information.183
CONCLUSION
Removing the two proffered justifications for the “curtilage” doctrine in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves us with two options, neither of
them entirely appealing. Recall that the curtilage doctrine seemingly found
its foundation in not one, but two distinct sources. First, the doctrine was
thought to be grounded in the text because—it was claimed—curtilage was
part of the home, and had been considered as such since the common law.184
Second, the curtilage was believed to be a place where it was especially
reasonable to think that we could expect privacy—it was perhaps second only

179

180
181
182
183

184

Contra Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (“When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the
curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has
occurred.”).
See Kerr, supra note 152 (“I don’t think that pulling off the tarp can be justified by the automobile
exception”).
As the Court recognized in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (internal citation omitted)
(“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.”).
See Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1529 (2018) (“No matter the degree of possession and
control, the car thief would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car.”).
Although this would not count as a burglary, as Blackstone makes clear:
Neither can burglary be committed in a tent or booth erected in a market or fair;
though the owner may lodge therein: for the law regards thus highly nothing but permanent
edifices; a house, or church, the wall, or gate of a town; and it is the folly of the owner
to lodge in so fragile a tenement: but his lodging there no more makes it burglary to
break it open, than it would be to uncover a tilted waggon [sic] in the same circumstances.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *226 (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.
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to the home in this.185 The textual hook for curtilage much of this Article
has attempted to discredit, still, it seems has several fans in the Justices of the
Supreme Court. Justice Scalia is no longer on the Court, but Justice
Thomas’s quotation from Blackstone in Collins, and Justice Sotomayor’s
reliance on Jardines, shows that his take on the original meaning of curtilage
shows no signs of going away. The reasonable expectation of privacy defense
of curtilage also seems to be well-entrenched. Even Justice Scalia relied on
it, if only in passing, and it seems to make up a large part of Justice
Sotomayor’s somewhat ambiguous articulation of the curtilage doctrine. In
short, the fiction of Fourth Amendment curtilage seems to be alive and well
on the Court—but what happens when we dispel that fiction?
For the textualist, the solution seems to be simple—acknowledge that the
curtilage is not part of the house and confine the protections to just what the
text says. If the curtilage is not the home, then the protections of the home
really do stop at (as Justice Scalia said in Kyllo) the firm boundary of the
entrance of the home.186 To be sure, it also protects buildings in the curtilage,
and also things “appurtenant” (or “attached”) to those buildings. Blackstone
would at least go this far. But these concessions do not get us to the idea that
the curtilage—the land surrounding the home—is itself protected as being
part of the home. The home really is just the home, according to the text.
Homes have walls; so too houses in the Fourth Amendment. The result here
is that we get a stingier Fourth Amendment, at least if we read “effects” as
limited to personal property and not extending to all owned property.
At this point, we might think that we are better off going with the more
flexible Katz test for what property does not get protected. We might think
that it is more honest, with its open admission that we are going outside and
beyond the text, and looking to contemporary values. And Katz can certainly
accept the idea that property near the home has a greater expectation of
privacy, which it gets not by virtue of being curtilage, but by virtue of being
a place where we can reasonably expect privacy. Curtilage really has no
place in the Katz world, because there are—or at least should be—no fixed
categories in that world; it really depends on which expectations are
reasonable, and that will depend on what place we are talking about. To the
extent that we use the labels of “curtilage” and “open fields,” they will be
placeholders until an argument is made or as conclusions to arguments that

185
186

See supra Part III.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“That line, we think, must be not only firm but
also bright . . . .”).
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have already been made. The Katz test can get us to protections of the places
we want to get protected, because any place could be a place that potentially
gets us protection. Its open-endedness and its lack of reliance on fixed
categories—persons, papers, houses, and effects—is its virtue.187
The open-endedness of Katz is also its vice. If the real meaning of privacy
is the expectations, then why not go all the way in rejecting all fixed
categories? This would mean abandoning curtilage, which has no place in
the text anyway, and is an invented category under the Fourth Amendment,
but also abandoning house and person and every other category. The Katz approach has
never had a satisfactory explanation for why the category of “house” does
not dissolve under its analysis. Is it the case that all houses are ones that we
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in? Maybe, but maybe not. The
universal acid of the Katz test may require us to go even further, in
distinguishing rooms (living rooms versus kitchens versus bathrooms versus
bedrooms) in the house that may not deserve protection; we may have to
fully disaggregate the home and its presumption of all of it being protected
under the Fourth Amendment.188 Pushed to its limit, “requiring a
consideration of Katz privacy factors to determine what constitutes the
curtilage would logically compel the use of those privacy factors to determine
what constitutes a house.”189 In any event, when we float away from the
text—as Katz would have us do—the automatic inclusion of any place or any
thing under the Fourth Amendment is precluded. At the very least, it has to
wait until we hear the argument about why that place or that thing is
something we can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in.190 The Katz
test is only capacious in principle. In practice, we do not know what gets
protected—or if anything gets protected. These criticisms are familiar,
perhaps, but with the collapse of curtilage we can see them in a new light.
The invented category of curtilage should be doing no work in the Fourth
Amendment analysis, whether you are an originalist or a Katzian. For the
187
188

189
190

See Curran, supra note 40, at 412–13 (arguing that Katz should support “reasonable privacy
expectations beyond the domestic intimacy of the curtilage”).
See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 905, 909 (2010) (“Even subjective expectations of privacy suggest a relative view of home
privacy and call into question the privileging of all things residential. Citizens ascribe much greater
intrusiveness to searches of bedrooms, for example, than searches of home garages, curbside
residential garbage, or surveillance of backyards.”).
Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 742 (1985).
Thus, it seems that it is right, under the Katz test, to criticize a defendant for his “faulty premise that
the Fourth Amendment protects places per se, as opposed to legitimate expectations of privacy.”
United States v. Thomas, No. 3:02CR00072, 2003 WL 21003462, at *5 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2003).
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originalist, it is because “curtilage” is not in the Fourth Amendment; it is not
in “house” and it is not in “effects.” For the Katzian, it is because there is
nothing but our “reasonable expectations” in the Fourth Amendment.
What is the defender of privacy to do? The best bet may be to take sides
with the textualist, all the while pushing for an expansive reading of “effects.”
Of course, there is the risk that the original meaning of effects cannot bear a
reading that includes real property in it. But suppose such a reading is
plausible. The text may in fact be able to bear that meaning, as many wills
that bequeath effects have been read as bequeathing real property.191 If it is,
then the Fourth Amendment opens up again, in much the same way that the
Fourth Amendment was thought to “open up” with the Katz test (before the
Burger Court closed nearly all of the doors it opened). The Fourth
Amendment now moves out of the home, and even out of the crabbed
confines of the curtilage, and into the world, so that any property that you
own—land, cars, etc.—gets to count as a constitutional space, trespass
against which for the sake of obtaining information counts as a “search” for
the Fourth Amendment. Even the open fields we own get protection on this
account. Of course, one should be wary of motivated readings of the Fourth
Amendment (or of any text) where we seek the interpretation of the text that
we want it to have rather than the one it does have. It seems, though, that
the existing alternatives are bad enough to excuse at least the effort.

191

See, e.g., In re Tyler, 207 Misc. 569, 570–71 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1954) (internal citations omitted) (“The
word ‘effects’ may sometimes be broad enough to encompass all of a testator’s property, both real
and personal. ‘Personal effects’ is a term that may have a somewhat more limited meaning, often
embracing only tangible personal property having an intimate relation to the person. Either term,
however, may be enlarged or restricted by its context and may vary in meaning from an allembracing term to one very restricted in scope.”).
Many other cases could be cited in this connection. See, e.g., In re Spriggs’ Estate, 225 P. 617,
619–20 (Mont. 1924) (holding that a testator’s use of “effects” included real property); Coffman’s
Adm’r v. Coffman, 109 S.E. 454, 459 (Va. 1921) (holding that the testator intended to include both
real and personal property when using the word “effects”); In re Stixrud’s Estate, 109 P. 343, 349
(Wash. 1910) (“[O]ur decision necessarily has the effect of applying the treaty provision [applying
the statute to “goods and effects”] to real as well as to personal property . . . .”); Andrews v.
Applegate, 79 N.E. 176, 177 (Ill. 1906) (“[I]n its broadest sense of property or worldly substance
[effects] may include land, and should be so construed when it appears from other parts of the will
that such was the testator's intention.”); Trustees of the Univ. v. Miller, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 188, 195
(N.C. 1831) (“Effects descending by inheritance must include land.”).
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APPENDIX

Figure 1: Photograph of Motorcycle Within
“Curtilage” of the Home from Collins192

Figure 2: Photograph Showing that Parking a Vehicle
Inside the Home is Not Unprecedented193

192
193

See Kerr, supra note 24.
Inside Edition, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OL2jBPycsVE.

